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DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS IN APPOINTING
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AS TRUSTEE OF THE
NONMARITAL TRUST
E. Edwin Eck*
I. INTRODUCTION
Married persons frequently prefer to devise their entire estate
to their surviving spouse. When advised of the federal estate taxes
that might be imposed on the estate of the surviving spouse if the
spouse inherited the entire estate, they are willing to consider al-
ternative dispositions that would reduce the amount of the federal
estate tax.
One of the first alternatives considered is a nonmarital trust.
Use of a nonmarital trust-sometimes referred to as a "bypass" or
"B" trust-allows the surviving spouse to receive the benefit of the
inheritance, and yet have the inherited assets bypass the surviving
spouse's estate for federal estate tax purposes.
For example, assume that a husband has a $1,200,000.00 ad-
justed gross estate and that his wife presently lacks an estate
which would be subject to potential federal estate taxation. If the
husband devises his entire estate to his wife, the unlimited marital
deduction will ensure that there will be no federal estate tax upon
his death. Upon his wife's subsequent death, however, the federal
estate taxes will total $235,000.00. If, instead, the husband's will
had provided that $600,000.00 of his estate would be transferred to
a nonmarital trust, there would be no federal estate taxes on the
death of either spouse.'
The projected federal estate savings from such a nonmarital
trust soon leads clients to a critical question: who should be trus-
tee? Spouses often have an immediate response: the surviving
spouse should be named trustee of such a trust. This response is
probably motivated by concern for the welfare of the surviving
spouse (hereinafter referred to in the feminine for convenience
only). Clients conclude that the widow should control the marital
estate after her husband's death. Furthermore, she should proba-
bly decide what should be expended for the children's benefit.
* B.A., Carleton College; J.D., University of Montana; LL.M., Georgetown University.
Mr. Eck is an associate in the firm of Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones in Billings,
Montana.
1. The federal estate tax computations are based upon the assumption that both hus-
band and wife die after 1986 and that the unified credit is $192,800.00. No consideration of
credits against the federal estate tax, other than the unified credit of I.R.C. § 2010 (CCH
1983), is made in these computations.
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The lawyer counseling the couple, however, should indicate
the advantages that favor the selection of a corporate trustee. Such
advantages are set forth by a variety of commentators.2 Despite
these advantages, many clients will still prefer, if not insist, that
the surviving spouse be named trustee of the nonmarital trust.
In naming the surviving spouse as trustee of the nonmarital
trust, the lawyer could recommend a conservative approach in
drafting the trust instrument. All of the income could be paid cur-
rently to the widow for her life. The remainder could pass outright
to the children in equal amounts or to the descendants of any de-
ceased child by representation. The trustee should not be given
any power to accumulate or spray income. The trustee could not
invade principal or in any fashion affect the beneficial enjoyment
of the trust property. Consequently, ordinary income would be
taxed currently to the wife as life beneficiary. Income allocable to
principal, such as realized capital gains, would be taxed to the
trust. Absent any compromising administrative provisions, the
trust should achieve its major purpose, i.e., none of its principal
would be included in the wife's gross estate.
Such a trust might serve -some clients' estate planning goals.
The testator would be assured that his surviving spouse would be
able to manage, in a fiduciary capacity, the trust assets. Such a
trust might also provide some assurances for the surviving spouse.
She would not have to rely on some corporate entity, or anyone
else, for the management of the trust property. Despite these as-
surances, both the testator and his wife would be struck with the
inflexibility of such a trust. The trustee is prevented from making
any distributions of principal to the wife based upon her needs
which might exceed available trust income. Nor would the trustee
be permitted to make distributions to the testator's children, or
their issue, during the surviving spouse's lifetime. Additionally,
such a trust prevents the surviving spouse from designating the
proportions of trust principal to be distributed to the children af-
ter her death.
This article will focus on some additional dispositive powers
which might be given the surviving spouse as trustee of a more
flexible nonmarital trust. The estate, gift, and income tax conse-
quences of each of these powers will be reviewed. Brief mention
will be made of special considerations relative to a nonmarital
trust, which is to be funded by way of disclaimer by the surviving
2. Moore, Choosing a Trustee-Individual or Corporate?, 8 A.B.A. LAW NOTES 81
(1972); CCH FIN. & EST. PLAN, V 1690; Bromberg & Fortson, Selection of a Trustee; Tax
and Other Considerations, 19 Sw. L.J. 523 (1965).
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spouse. Finally, a summary of the administrative powers typically
included in trust instruments will be discussed insofar as such
powers might compromise the testator's objectives.'
II. ADDITIONAL DISPOSITIVE POWERS
A. A power to distribute principal to the surviving spouse
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to her health,
education, support, or maintenance
1. Estate and Gift Tax
One additional dispositive power which could make the
nonmarital trust more flexible is a power in the trustee to make
distributions of principal to the surviving spouse. This power must
be limited by an ascertainable standard relating to her health, edu-
cation, support, or maintenance. Without such a limitation, the
spouse as trustee would have authority to make unrestricted distri-
butions to herself as beneficiary. Such authority would constitute a
general power of appointment within the definition of I.R.C. sec-
tion 2041(b)(1). Consequently, the property subject to the
power-i.e., the trust principal-would be included in the surviv-
ing spouse's gross estate.4
I.R.C. section 2041(b)(2) provides an exception to this general
rule if the power is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to
the power holder's "health, education, support, or maintenance."
Additionally, such a power is not considered a general power of
appointment for gift tax purposes.'
Sections 20.2041-1(c)(2) and 25.2514-1(c)(2) of the Treasury
Regulations set forth some safe harbors for drafting ascertainable
standards. Those safe harbors include distributions for "support,"
"maintenance," "education, including college and professional edu-
cation," "health," and "medical, dental and hospital and nursing
expenses and expenses of invalidism." The terms "support" and
"maintenance" may be modified by the following phrases: "in his
accustomed manner of living," "in health and reasonable comfort,"
3. See Cox, Income and Estate Tax Aspects of Surviving Spouse Beneficiary Serving
as Executor-Trustee: Effect of Stranger as Co-Trustee, 22 N.Y.U. INST. 1041 (1964) and
Crane, The Surviving Spouse as Sole Trustee-A Neglected Estate Planning Tool, 9 Omo
N.U.L. REv. 205 (19S2) for a discussion of tax issues associated with service by the surviving
spouse as trustee of the nonmarital trust.
4. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (CCH 1983).
5. I.R.C. § 2514(c)(1) (CCH 1983).
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and "in reasonable comfort." These regulations indicate that the
terms "support" and "maintenance" are synonymous and that the
two terms include more than the bare necessities of life.
In addition to providing safe harbors for drafting purposes,
sections 20.2041-1(c)(2) and 25.2514-1(c)(2) of the Treasury Regu-
lations include language which does not create an ascertainable
standard. A trust instrument which allows the trustee to make dis-
tributions to herself for her "welfare," her "happiness '6 or her
"comfort" is not limited by ascertainable standards.
The reporters are replete with examples of attempts by drafts-
men to deviate from the safe harbors of the Regulations. Some of
these attempts have achieved unbelievable success, after litiga-
tion.7 For example, in Barritt v. Tomlinson,8 the trust instrument
gave the life beneficiary authority to use principal "as she may see
fit." The court held that such was an ascertainable standard under
local law within the meaning of section 2041(b)(2). Similarly, a
court held that the authority to withdraw principal "as he may
from time to time request, he to be the sole judge of his needs" was
also limited by the appropriate ascertainable standard.'
In contrast, another court has held that authority to receive
"such amount out of the principal, as my said wife may from time
to time require" was not limited by an ascertainable standard. 10 A
power to invade if "necessary or advisable in order to provide for
• ..reasonable needs and proper expenses or. . .benefit or com-
fort" was also held not limited by an ascertainable standard."
Similarly, a power to invade principal in the event of need for
"care, comfort and enjoyment" was held not to be an ascertainable
standard. 2 Differences in local law can explain some of these ap-
6. One court has held that "happiness" constitutes an ascertainable standard. See
Brantingham v. United States, 631 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1980). However, the Service will not
follow that decision. Rev. Rul. 82-63, 1982-1 C.B. 135.
7. See generally, Alessandroni, Tax and Other Implications of Powers Measured by a
Definite or Ascertainable Standard, 4 INST. ON ESTATE PLAN. 70.900 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Alessandroni].
8. 129 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1955).
9. Pittsfield Nat'l Bank v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 851 (D. Mass. 1960).
10. Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1969).
11. Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 386 (1964),
reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 910 (1964).
12. Stafford v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Wis. 1964). A number of other
cases indicate that the term "comfort" used by itself may not constitute an ascertainable
standard within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) (CCH 1983). See First Virginia Bank
v. United States, 490 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1974), where an invasion power for "comfort and
care" was found not limited by an ascertainable standard. Similarly, in Whelan v. United
States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 13,393 (S.D. Cal. 1980), where an invasion power for
"reasonable support, care, and comfort" was deemed not ascertainable. On the other hand,
218 [Vol. 45
NONMARITAL TRUST
parently inconsistent conclusions.
The Internal Revenue Service (Service) takes the position that
a power given to the trustee-beneficiary to make a distribution to
"meet an emergency" is not within the protection of Section
2041(b)(1)(A) and 2514(c)(1). The basis for the Service's position is
that the term "emergency" relates to the timeliness of a distribu-
tion and does not necessarily relate to health, education, support,
or maintenance.'" While the Tax Court has upheld the Service, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Trustee's author-
ity to distribute principal to herself "to meet an emergency" is lim-
ited by an ascertainable standard under New Mexico law. 4
Reliance on case law favorable to taxpayers, however, simply
does not make sense from a planning perspective. A draftsman
who deviates from the safe harbors of the Regulations should ex-
pect a challenge by the Service.5
Even if the draftsman has cautiously used safe harbor lan-
guage from the regulations, he should forego the temptations to
increase trust flexibility to limit trustee liability by adding phrases
such as "in the trustee's uncontrolled and absolute discretion,"
"without regard to local law," or "without liability except for
fraud." Typically, where a standard for distribution is stated in a
trust instrument, the courts will not interfere with the trustee's
discretion unless the power is abused.'6 So long as the trustee's dis-
cretion is not modified by some of the above phrases, the courts
will preempt the trustee's powers only if they are unreasonably
exercised.
In addition, if the discretion is "uncontrolled," "unfettered,"
or "absolute," the courts will have power to review the exercise (or
nonexercise) of the power. The scope of the courts' review in such
circumstances is unclear. The Restatement of Trusts indicates that
the use of such terms as "absolute," "unlimited," or "uncon-
trolled" merely dispenses with the standard of reasonableness.'
The trustee must act "in a state of mind in which it was contem-
plated by the settlor that he would act. . . .Thus, the trustee will
the standard "reasonable care, comfort and support" has been deemed ascertainable. Tuck-
er v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,026 (S.D. Cal. 1974). The court did not
discuss whether "comfort" was being regarded as a separate and independent standard.
13. See Private Letter Rul. 7841006; Private Letter Rul. 8304009.
14. Sowell v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1001 (1980), rev'd, 708 F.2d 1564 (10th Cir. 1983).
15. See Rev. Rul. 77-60, 1977-1 C.B. 283; Private Letter Rul. 8121010; Private Letter
Rul. 8228001; Private Letter Rul. 8249015.
16. See A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 187 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES § 56 (rev. 2d ed. 1980).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 comment j (1959).
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not be permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other
than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, or ordinarily
to act arbitrarily, without an exercise of judgment."18 Despite this
position of the Restatement, some case law suggests that when, for
example, a payment to a beneficiary is unreasonably small, the
trustee has failed to act "in a state of mind contemplated by the
settlor." 19
In short, the effect of such terms as "uncontrolled," "unfet-
tered," or "absolute" discretion is unclear. Certainly, they are
likely to expand the definition of reasonableness. A California
court has held that the words "uncontrolled discretion" destroyed
an otherwise ascertainable standard. 0 Consequently, if an ascer-
tainable standard is to be used, prudence directs that the drafts-
man stay within the unmodified safe harbors of the Regulations.
Even when the trustee has discretion to make distributions of
principal to herself limited by a properly drafted ascertainable
standard, a question could arise if the trustee elects not to make a
distribution when the standard has been triggered. Section
20.2041-1(c)(2) of the Treasury Regulations suggests that it is nec-
essary to exercise the discretion if the standard is met.2 1 Conse-
quently, from a drafting standpoint, the trustee should be directed
to make a distribution in mandatory language (e.g., "shall") and
not be given discretion in permissive language (e.g., "may").2 2
2. Income Tax
The existence of a power in the trustee to distribute trust
principal to herself raises a possibility that trust capital gains may
be income taxable to the trustee-beneficiary. Section 678(a)(1) of
the I.R.C. treats the beneficiary as the owner of any portion of a
trust over which such a person has a power exercisable solely by
herself to vest the principal or income in herself. If a person is
18. Id.
19. See Colin v. Murdock, 137 N.J. Eq. 12, 43 A.2d 218 (1945).
20. Friedman v. Cory, 94 Cal. App. 3d 667, 156 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1979).
21. Additionally, if I.R.C. § 2514(e) would treat a failure to make a distribution as a
lapse, it is arguable that a portion of the trust capital gains could be subject to income tax
under I.R.C. §§ 674, 677.
22. See Form A of the Appendix for an example of trust language requiring a distribu-
tion if the ascertainable standard is met. The form is modeled after that suggested by J.
Horn, Planning Flexible Trusts for Nonprofessional Trustees: Analysis of Choices for
Draftsmen, 4 EST. PLAN. 172, 177 (1977). This form also requires the consideration of the
appointee's other resources. This will probably coincide with the testator's intent. Addition-
ally, it represents a conservative approach to ensure that an ascertainable standard has been
stated. Finally, note the absence of language which might broaden the standard, such as "in
the trustee's absolute discretion."
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treated as the owner of a trust under section 678(a)(1), section 671
provides for taxing the income of that portion to the beneficiary.
Section 678 does not contain an express statutory exception for
distributions limited by ascertainable standards, as do sections
2041 and 2514.
It is arguable that if the standard for distribution meets one of
the exceptions to section 674, it should not cause section 678 tax
treatment to a trustee-beneficiary. Generally, section 674(a) causes
a grantor of a trust to be taxed on trust income if he, or a nonad-
verse party,2 has the ability to control the beneficial enjoyment of
trust property without the consent of an adverse party.24 One ex-
ception to the general rule of section 674(a) is an authority to dis-
tribute principal to a beneficiary or beneficiaries or to or for a class
of beneficiaries provided the power is limited by a "reasonably def-
inite standard" which is set forth in the trust instrument.25
A second and similar exception to the general rule of section
674(a) relates to the distribution of income. A trustee (other than
the grantor or the grantor's spouse living with the grantor) may
distribute, apportion, or accumulate income for beneficiaries if
such power is limited by a "reasonably definite external standard"
which is set forth in the trust instrument. 26 The Regulations sug-
gest that the standard relating to the principal of the trust in sec-
tion 674(b)(5)(A) is the same as the standard relating to the in-
come of the trust in section 674(d). 7 In other words, the term
"external" adds nothing to the standard of sections 674(b)(5)(A)
and (d).' s
There is a distinction, however, between the standard of these
subsections and the ascertainable standard of sections 2041 and
2514. For example, authority in the trustee to make distributions
to herself for "her reasonable support and comfort" or "to meet an
emergency" are within the safe harbors of the regulations under
section 674 but are not within the safe harbors of the regulations
under sections 2041 and 2514. Clearly, for example, the authority
to distribute principal for "health, education, and support" would
be within the safe harbors of the regulations under all of these sec-
23. I.R.C. § 672(b) (CCH 1983) defines a non-adverse party as any person who is not
an adverse party.
24. I.R.C. § 672(a) (CCH 1983) defines an adverse party as any person having a sub-
stantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or
nonexercise of the power which he possesses respecting the trust.
25. I.R.C. § 674(b)(5)(A) (CCH 1983).
26. I.R.C. § 674(d) (CCH 1983).
27. See TREAs. REG. §§ 1.674(b)-1(b)(5)(i), 1.674(d)-i.
28. See Alessandroni, supra note 7, at 70.907.
19841
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tions. It is arguable, then, that a standard which meets the require-
ments of section 674 should not cause income taxation under sec-
tion 678.
Unfortunately, relevant case law is scarce. An often-cited case
in favor of the taxpayer on this issue is United States v.
DeBonchamps."9 The beneficiaries of life estates had powers to in-
vade principal for "needs, maintenance, and comfort." The Service
contended that those powers should cause the holders to be taxed
on capital gains. The court rejected the Service's contention and
concluded that the limits on the power did not cause taxation
under section 678.0 A series of cases under the pre-1954 Code also
reached the same conclusion, so long as the power is limited."1 If
the power to invade principal is unrestricted, however, income will
be taxed to the holder.3 2
It is unclear whether the Service intends to pursue this issue.
The Service did hold in Private Letter Ruling 8211057 that a trus-
tee who had authority to invade trust principal for her "support,
welfare, and maintenance" would be treated as the owner of the
trust under section 678. The Service emphasized that a sole indi-
vidual beneficiary held the power. The Service did not discuss
whether the invasion power constituted an ascertainable
standard. 8
This uncertainty has caused a number of commentators to
state that the lack of an express statutory exception to section 678
and the lack of sufficient precedents to support such an exception
does not give the kind of confidence estate planners would gener-
ally appreciate.3 The risk in the prototype trust suggested in this
29. 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States,
181 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
30. The Ninth Circuit's decision has support in the legislative history of I.R.C. § 678:
"A person other than the grantor may be treated as the substantial owner of a trust if he
has an unrestricted power to take the trust principal or income .... " H.R. Rep. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A211, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4145, 4357. (em-
phasis added).
31. See Townsend v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 1380 (1945); May v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 860 (1947);
Oppenheimer v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 515 (1951); United States v. Smither, 205 F.2d 518 (5th
Cir. 1953); United States v. Funk, 185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950); Spies v. United States, 84 F.
Supp. 769 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd, 152 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1945); Koffman v. United States, 300
F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1960).
32. See Falk v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1951); Hirshmann v. United States, 202
F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
33. Clearly, the term "welfare" would not constitute an ascertainable standard under
I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) or I.R.C. § 2514(c)(1) (CCH 1983).
34. See Halbach, Power of Distribution, Invasion and Appointment, 32 MAJOR TAX
PLAN. 1 1404.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Halbach); Strauss, Selection of a Trustee: Bene-
ficiary-Trustees, 28 N.Y.U. INST. 853, 867 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Strauss].
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article is limited to the trust's capital gains, since the surviving
spouse is the beneficiary of the ordinary income. Whether this ad-
ditional risk is of sufficient magnitude to deter clients from adding
such a power is a decision to be made on a client-by-client basis.
B. An intervivos power to distribute principal to the testator's
children and their descendants subject to certain limitations
A second additional dispositive power which could make the
nonmarital trust more flexible is a power in the trustee to make
distributions of principal to the testator's children (and perhaps
other descendants). Logic would suggest that if the trustee is per-
mitted to make principal distributions to herself limited by an as-
certainable standard and avoid estate tax exposure, she should be
able to have a similar power to make distributions to her children
and their descendants without any estate tax exposure. Reliance
on such logic, however, is misfounded if the trustee has an obliga-
tion to support the child or descendants.
1. Estate Tax
Treasury Regulation sections 20.2041-1(c)(1) and 25.2514-
1(c)(1) provide that a power exercisable for the purpose of dis-
charging the legal obligation of the donee or for his pecuniary ben-
efit is a general power of appointment. As a result, the property
subject to a general power of appointment will be included in the
power holder's estate under section 2041, and an exercise of the
power would be subject to gift tax under section 2514. In a 1979
Revenue Ruling,3 the Service indicated that the principal of a
trust would be included in the gross estate of a person who had a
power to appoint the trust property for the health, education, sup-
port, and maintenance of the power holder's children, if the power
holder had a legal obligation to support the children. The ascer-
tainable standard exception of section 2041(b)(1)(A) and section
2514(c) applies to distributions made directly to the power holder.
No such exceptions exist if the distribution is to another person.
Certainly, one could argue with the Service's position. It is un-
reasonable that a person would be deemed to have a general power
of appointment if she can use trust property for the benefit of an-
other person and yet not be deemed to have a general power if she
can use trust property for her own benefit if limited by an ascer-
tainable standard. The term "legal obligation" used in the regula-
35. Rev. Rul. 79-154, 1979-1 C.B. 301.
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tion should be construed to apply to the claims of creditors and
similar obligations, rather than the legal obligation of support.
Furthermore, state law typically provides that trust distributions
are to satisfy a person's legal obligation to support in only two cir-
cumstances: one, when the trust was established for the express
purpose of discharging that support obligation; and two, when the
person obligated to provide support is financially unable to do so.3
From the standpoint of planning, the simple solution is merely
to restrict distributions so that none will satisfy the trustee's obli-
gation of support.3 7 Such a restriction has been given effect by the
courts.38
2. Gift Tax
As previously noted, the trust prototype suggested in this arti-
cle provides that the surviving spouse is to receive all income of
the trust during her lifetime. If she, as trustee, is also given an
intervivos authority to appoint trust principal to the testator's
children and their descendants, would not such an appointment
constitute a gift, within the meaning of section 2511(a)? That sec-
tion effectively imposes federal gift taxation on transfers of prop-
erty in which the transferor has a beneficial interest. If the spouse-
trustee makes an intervivos appointment of principal, she has in
fact transferred the trust income that would be generated from the
appointed principal. Treasury Regulation section 25.2514-1(b)(2)
suggests such a result.
However, Treasury Regulation section 25.2511-1(g)(2) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
If a trustee has a beneficial interest in trust property, a transfer
of the property by the trustee is not a taxable transfer if it is
made pursuant to a fiduciary power the exercise or non-exercise
of which is limited by a reasonably fixed or ascertainable stan-
dard which is set forth in the trust instrument.3
36. See generally, 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 77 (1971).
37. See Form B of the Appendix for an example of trust language which prohibits
distributions which would satisfy the trustee's obligation to support. Such a limitation may
benefit trusts other than those which are the subject of this article, in an attempt to limit
generation skipping transfer tax liability. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 26.2613-4(c)(3) indicates
that anyone whose legal obligation of support may be discharged by trust distributions is a
beneficiary of a trust by virtue of this potential discharge. The proposed regulations take
this position regardless of who serves as trustee.
38. See Upjohn v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,888 (W.D. Mich.
1972); William v. United States, 378 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Cf. Rev. Rul. 81-6, 1981-1 C.B.
385.
39. See Form B of the Appendix for an example of trust language which limits distri-
butions to the ascertainable standard of health, education, and support.
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Consequently, so long as the power to distribute to the children (or
their descendants) is held in a fiduciary capacity, and so long as
the trust instrument limits such intervivos distributions to an as-
certainable standard, an exercise by the trustee of the power
should not generate any gift tax. 0
3. Generation Skipping Transfer Tax.
The addition of authority in the trustee-spouse to make distri-
butions to the testator's children and their descendants causes
some potential generation skipping transfer tax exposure.41 For the
purposes of that tax, a beneficiary is defined as any person who has
a present or future interest or power in trust.42 Section 2613(d)(1)
indicates that a person has an interest in the trust if he has a right
to receive income or corpus from the trust or is a permissible recip-
ient of such income or corpus. The testator's surviving spouse has
an interest in the trust by reason of her right to trust income. Ad-
ditionally, a child of the testator will have a present interest in the
trust by reason of the trustee's ability to distribute principal to the
child based upon an ascertainable standard. If a child survives the
testator, but predeceases the surviving spouse, there would be a
potential generation skipping tax because his death would produce
a "taxable termination" within the meaning of section 2613(b)(1).
The generation skipping tax would be deferred until the surviving
spouse's death.
This generation skipping transfer tax exposure may cause the
testator to conclude that no authority should be given to make dis-
tributions to his children during the term of the trust.4" The sur-
viving spouse might meet the needs of the children or their de-
scendants from her own funds.
On the other hand, the testator might conclude that the addi-
tional flexibility in the trust by including authority for the trustee
40. In Self v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1956), the income beneficiary of
a trust had a non-fiduciary power to appoint trust principal to his descendants. The power
was not limited by an ascertainable standard. The Court of Claims concluded that the exer-
cise of such a power was not subject to gift taxation and reasoned that the donee was acting
as the agent of the donor.
The court's ruling appears contrary to Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(e) Example (1). The
Service has indicated that it does not intend to follow Self to the extent that it is contrary
to the regulations. Rev. Rul. 79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342.
41. See generally, Halbach, supra note 34, at 1403.3.
42. I.R.C. § 2613(c)(3) (CCH 1983).
43. The children's only interest would be a future one as remaindermen upon the ter-
mination of the trust, and a taxable termination by definition, does not include a termina-
tion of an interest of any person who only has a future interest in the trust. I.R.C. §
2613(b)(1) (CCH 1983).
19841 225
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
to make distributions to the children (and their descendants) out-
weighs the disadvantages of generation skipping transfer tax expo-
sure. The likelihood of imposition of the generation skipping trans-
fer tax may be minimal. First, a taxable termination will only occur
in an unlikely order of deaths. A child must predecease the surviv-
ing spouse, but not the testator. Second, the "grandchild exclu-
sion" excludes from the generation skipping transfer tax transfers
to grandchildren up to the amount of $250,000.00 per child of the
testator."
C. A power in the surviving spouse to withdraw annually the
greater of $5,000.00 or five (5) percent of the trust principal
A third additional dispositive power which could make the
nonmarital trust more flexible is a power in the surviving spouse to
withdraw annually the greater of $5,000.00 or five (5) percent of
the trust principal. The prototype for the nonmarital trust only
provides for trust income to be distributed to the surviving spouse.
Even if the testator elects to include a power in the trustee-spouse
to make distributions of principal to herself as beneficiary, such
distributions must be limited to an ascertainable standard relating
to health, education, support, and maintenance.4 5 The testator
could envision, for example, a situation where his spouse would
like to travel and trust income would not be sufficient to discharge
the projected travel expenses. Further, the proposed travel might
not be justified under an ascertainable standard within the mean-
ing of sections 2041(b)(1)(A) or 2514(c)(1). The right of the surviv-
ing spouse to additionally withdraw the greater of $5,000.00 or five
(5) percent of the trust principal could provide her with at least
some of the money she might want to implement her travel plans.
The so-called "five or five" power has even more practical uses
when the surviving spouse is not named trustee of the nonmarital
trust. If the testator names a corporate trustee, for example, the
unfettered right in the spouse to withdraw the greater of $5,000.00
or five (5) percent of the trust principal can be reassuring to the
testator and also tend to reduce potential conflict between the sur-
viving spouse and the trustee. Thus, the use of the five or five
power is not unique to the situation when the surviving spouse is
to be trustee. However, because of the unusual estate, gift, and in-
come tax features of such a power, a discussion of the power is
advisable.
44. I.R.C. § 2613(b)(6) (CCH 1983).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 4-22.
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1. Estate and Gift Tax
By definition, a general power of appointment is one which is
exercisable in favor of the donee, the donee's estate, the donee's
creditors, or the creditors of her estate.4 The donee's dominion
over the appointive property is tantamount to ownership. The do-
nee's dominion terminates after an effective exercise of the power
in favor of an appointee. Additionally, the dominion terminates af-
ter a release of the power to takers in default. The donee's domin-
ion also terminates after a lapse of the power. A release or a lapse
is just as functional as an exercise in terminating the donee's do-
minion over the appointive property. Both a release and a lapse
affect the beneficial enjoyment of the property. For the purposes of
the federal estate and gift tax, a release or a lapse constitutes a
conveyance of the appointive property by the donee. 47
The gross estate includes property which is subject to a gen-
eral power of appointment which lapses upon the decedent's death.
The gross estate also includes property with respect to which the
decedent at any time exercised or released a general power of ap-
pointment which is of such a nature that, if it were a transfer of
property owned by the decedent, the property would be includable
in the decedent's gross estate under sections 2035 to 2038.48 The
lapse of a general power is treated as a "release" of such a power.4 9
For example, assume that the donee of a general power of ap-
pointment is also the income beneficiary of a trust. The general
power is limited to the right to withdraw a specified dollar amount
from the trust on a certain date. If the donee allows her power to
lapse, she would have made a transfer of the specified dollar
amount and would have retained the right to income therefrom for
life. If this had been a gratuitous transfer by the donee of owned
property with the retention of income for her life, it would be in-
cludable in her gross estate under section 2036(a)(1). Conse-
quently, it is included in her estate under section 2041(a)(2).
The first sentence of section 2041(b)(2) provides that the lapse
of a general power is to be considered a release. Additionally, that
subsection further reads:
The preceding sentence shall apply with respect to the lapse of
powers during any calendar year only to the extent that the prop-
46. I.R.C. §§ 2041(b), 2514(c) (CCH 1983).
47. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (CCH 1983) includes a release in the gross estate. Section
2041(b)(2) includes a lapse in the gross estate. I.R.C. § 2514(b) (CCH 1983) prescribes simi-
lar gift tax consequences for a release and § 2514(e) does the same for a lapse.
48. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (CCH 1983).
49. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) (CCH 1983).
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erty, which could have been appointed by exercise of such lapsed
powers, exceeded in value, at the time of such lapse, the greater
of the following amounts:
A. $5,000.00, or
B. Five (5) percent of the aggregate value, at the time of such
lapse, of the assets out of which, or the proceeds of which, the
exercise of the lapsed powers could have been satisfied.
The preceding language provides the basis for the five or five
power. As noted above, if the life beneficiary of a trust had a right
to withdraw $5,000.00 each calendar year, and if she elects not to
exercise her power in a given year, she will not be deemed to have
made a transfer for federal estate tax purposes. Absent the previ-
ously quoted language of section 2041(b)(2), the life beneficiary
would have to include the property subject to the power in her
gross estate. A similar exception is applicable for gift tax purposes
in section 2514(e).
Drafting the five or five power should be done carefully, con-
sidering sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e). The power should be lim-
ited to withdrawals in each calendar year. It should expressly be
made noncumulative. It should provide that any amount not with-
drawn in any calendar year shall lapse and may not be withdrawn
in any other year. Finally, it should specify when the power shall
lapse.5°
The existence of the five or five power is not without its poten-
tial estate tax cost. If the donee dies not having exercised the
power in the year of her death, the greater of $5,000.00 or five (5)
percent of the value of the trust principal would be included in her
estate under section 2041. Many clients will conclude that such is a
small cost to pay for the added flexibility given the spouse for the
years she survives the husband.
It has been suggested that if the withdrawal power is limited
to a brief period, such as the last month of any year, and if the
donee dies during any of the other eleven months of the year, the
amount subject to withdrawal would not be includable in her es-
tate because the donee would not have a power of appointment on
the date of her death.51 The author is unaware of any case law
50. Such a five or five power could be modeled after that suggested by Farrell, Power
to Invade a Trust Need Not Result in Tax to a Beneficiary, 8 TAX'N FOR LAW 32 (1979). See
Form C of the Appendix for an example of a five or five power.
51. A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, 1243 n.57 aa (3d ed. Supp. 1978); Strauss, supra
note 34, at 879; Halbach, supra note 34, at 1402.2j Moore, Caution: Boilerplate May Be
Hazardous to Your Client's Tax Health, 14 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 501.7 (1980); Turley, The
Five or Five Power: An Obscure Estate Planning Tool, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 701, 706
(1976).
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relating to this device. In any event, even if the device is unsuc-
cessful, the estate tax cost is minimal.
2. Income Tax
The existence of the five or five power should have no impact
on the ordinary income of the trust because our prototype already
provides that the surviving spouse will receive the net income of
the trust. However, the power will cause the surviving spouse to be
taxed upon a portion of the capital gains of the trust.2 As noted,
section 678(a) provides that a person other than the grantor shall,
for income tax purposes, be treated as the owner of any portion of
a trust with respect to which such person has a power, exercisable
solely by herself, to vest the principal or income therefrom, in her-
self.53 For example, if the trust principal equals or exceeds
$100,000.00, the right of withdrawal is limited to five percent of the
value of the trust assets. The donee will be subject to income taxa-
tion on five percent of the trust's capital gains. If the trust princi-
pal is less than $100,000.00, then the donee will be subject to in-
come taxation on a percentage of the trust determined by dividing
$5,000 by the value of the trust assets on the last day of the exis-
tence of the power. For example, assume that the value of the trust
principal totals $62,500.00 on the last day of the year. The donee
will be subject to income taxation on eight (8) percent of the capi-
tal gains of the trust. ($5,000/$62,500 = 8%). Again, this income
tax cost is small compared with the greater trust flexibility.
A series of five or five power lapses presents a potentially more
serious problem in regard to capital gains. The Service could argue
that the donee should be taxed on an ever increasing percentage of
the trust capital gains under sections 671 through 677. Thus, the
donee could be treated as the owner of the five percent of the trust
after the first calendar year in which her power lapsed, as owner of
ten (10) percent after the second calendar year, and so on. 4
Certainly, there are ample arguments that lapses of the five or
five power should not cause such a result. Neither sections 671
through 679, nor any of the regulations thereunder, define "gran-
tor." Common law should suggest that the husband in our proto-
type trust should be deemed the "grantor" because he created the
trust by way of his will. Furthermore, under the relation back doc-
trine, the husband is treated as the donor and the wife is treated
52. Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34.
54. A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, 1279, n.78 (4th ed. 1980).
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as the donee. The appointee is deemed to have received the prop-
erty from the donor, not the donee. While admittedly sections 2041
and 2514 constitute an express nonacceptance of the relation back
doctrine for estate and gift tax purposes, there is no corresponding
section of the code for income tax purposes. If these sections are to
be relied upon to determine who is the grantor of the trust for
income tax purposes, then they should be looked to in their en-
tirety and apply only to lapses which surpass the five or five pro-
tection of section 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e).5
The absence of case law on this question suggests that the
question may be more academic than real. Even if the Service
should successfully advance this contention, the exercise of the five
or five power should provide the donee with ample resources to
satisfy any increased income tax liability as the result of the trust's
capital gains. Furthermore, again, many will conclude that this po-
tential income tax cost should not deter the use of the five or five
power in light of the increased trust flexibility.
D. A special testamentary power of appointment in the
surviving spouse to appoint the principal among the testator's
descendants
A fourth additional dispositive power which could increase the
flexibility of the nonmarital trust is a testamentary power, in the
surviving spouse, to appoint the trust principal among the testa-
tor's descendants. Such a power allows the surviving spouse a
second look at the needs and circumstances of the testator's de-
scendants at a time closer to the ultimate distribution of the re-
mainder. The mere existence of such a power may also promote,
superficially at least, a more satisfactory relationship between the
surviving spouse and the testator's descendants. Because the per-
missible appointees are limited to the testator's descendants, the
trust principal will not, by definition, be subject to the estate tax
under section 2041. Furthermore, the existence of the power does
not raise any income tax issues.
III. NONMARITAL TRUSTS FUNDED By WAY OF DISCLAIMER BY THE
SURVIVING SPOUSE
With the enactment of section 2518 as part of the Tax Reform
55. See Huff, The "Five or Five" Power and Lapsed Powers of Withdrawal, 15 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. 700 (1981) for a thorough analysis of these income tax issues.
56. See Form D of the Appendix for an example of such a special testamentary power
of appointment.
230 [Vol. 45
NONMARITAL TRUST
Act of 1976 7 and its modification by the Revenue Act of 197858
and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,11 a number of law-
yers have recommended that their clients with moderate sized
marital estates (approximately $400,000 to $750,000) consider the
use of "standby" nonmarital trusts. Typically, the surviving spouse
is given the entire residuary estate in a fashion that qualifies for
the marital deduction. Additionally, the will includes provisions for
a nonmarital trust to be funded, if at all, by way of a qualified
disclaimer.6 0 The use of this standby nonmarital trust attracts
some clients for a number of reasons. Because of their age, their
health, the current value of their marital estates, their inability to
accurately forecast any increases or decreases in such values, and
the scheduled phase-in of the unified credit under section 2010,
these clients are uncertain whether they wish to require the estab-
lishment of a nonmarital trust in their wills. The use of the
standby trust offers clients a means of postponing their decision.
The surviving spouse may decide on the need for such a trust
within the period of section 2518(b)(2) and applicable state law af-
ter the death of the first spouse to die. By then, a number of the
client's questions should be resolved. While the use of this device
apparently increases flexibility for the surviving spouse, at least, it
also has its drawbacks."
The four requirements of a qualified disclaimer are set forth in
section 2518(b). First, the refusal must be in writing. Second, the
writing must be received no later than nine months from the death
of transferor (or the date on which the disclaimant attains age
twenty-one). Third, the disclaimant must not have accepted the
interest or any of its benefits. Fourth, the interest must pass, with-
out any direction on the disclaimant's part, either to the dece-
dent's spouse, or to some person other than the disclaimant.
This fourth requirement-that the interest pass without any
direction on the part of the disclaimant-raises a question over the
permissible powers which might be granted the spouse as trustee
of the standby trust. The test set forth in the proposed regulations
is whether "the surviving spouse [can] direct the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the disclaimed property [to another person] in a transfer
57. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009, 90 Stat. 1520, 1893 (1976).
58. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702, 92 Stat. 2763, 2935 (1978).
59. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 425, 95 Stat. 172, 318
(1981).
60. See Form E of the Appendix for an example of a disposition to nonmarital trust
which may be funded by way of disclaimer.
61. See Carpenter & Hanna, Disclaimers: A Pre-Mortem Estate Planning Tool, 121
TRUSTS & ESTATES 47 (1982).
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that is not subject to Federal estate and gift tax."6 The Proposed
Regulations indicate, by way of example, that the surviving spouse
cannot have a special power to appoint principal among designated
beneficiaries. 3 Consequently, it would appear that the spouse trus-
tee could not be given a special intervivos power to distribute prin-
cipal to the testator's children or their descendants. Additionally,
she should not be given a special testamentary power of appoint-
ment to appoint the principal among the testator's descendants.
Example 6 of the same Proposed Regulation permits a quali-
fied disclaimer to a trust where the spouse has an income interest
and a power to invade principal for her health and maintenance.
The reasoning is unclear, but apparently, the surviving spouse's in-
terest as a potential appointee of the principal of the nonmarital
trust does not disqualify the disclaimer because any portion of the
nonmarital trust passing to another pursuant to the surviving
spouse's subsequent direction will be subject to transfer tax. " This
author is uncertain of the soundness of this example of the pro-
posed regulation. The surviving spouse's power to invade for her
health or maintenance gives the surviving spouse the power to di-
rect the disposition of the property. Perhaps it can be rationalized
on the theory that if she does not exercise the power, the spouse in
effect permits the property to pass to the remaindermen of the
trust free of additional transfer tax. The remaindermen already
have received the property subject to a transfer tax on the death of
the first spouse to die. Put another way, without the invasion
power, the remaindermen would receive the property anyway. The
addition of the invasion power only allows the surviving spouse to
invade for her own benefit.6 Any subsequent transfer by her would
be subject to transfer tax.
If the preceding is an accurate rationalization of the Service's
position, then it would follow that the surviving spouse could also
be given a five or five power. If she exercises her power and subse-
quently makes a transfer, the latter transfer would be subject to
transfer taxation. If she fails to exercise her five or five power, the
property subject to the power in the year of her death would be
included in her gross estate. The remaindermen would receive the
property anyway. 66
62. Proposed Tress. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(2).
63. Proposed Tress. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5) Example (5).
64. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5) discussed in Frimmer, Proposed Regs
under Section 2518 Explain and Expand the Federal Disclaimer Statute, 53 J. TAX'N 266,
269 (1980).
65. Id.
66. Not all commentators agree with this analysis. See Mulligan, Proposed Regula-
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The uncertainty in this area suggests that the surviving spouse
should not be given any of the four proposed discretionary powers
discussed in the preceding section. In other words, if the spouse is
to serve as trustee of a standby trust, the trust should simply in-
clude the provisions of the prototype. She should receive all of the
current income for life. Upon her death, the remainder could pass
outright to the children in equal amounts or the descendants of
any deceased child by representation.
If more flexibility is desired for the standby trust, the spouse
simply should not be appointed trustee or a standby trust should
not be used. Perhaps this lack of flexibility in the dispositive provi-
sions of the trust may be counterbalanced by the greater flexibility
given to the surviving spouse to determine the extent the trust is
to be funded. She might decide to disclaim less so that she will
receive a greater portion of the residuary estate outright. Obvi-
ously, her discretion over the subsequent disposition of the nondis-
claimed property in such a situation would be essentially
unlimited.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
Administrative powers do not directly address the time when
the trust beneficiaries will receive the benefits of trust income or
principal, the extent of such benefits, or the identity of the benefi-
ciaries. These considerations, which are usually referred to as dis-
positive powers, are typically drafted with the careful considera-
tion of their estate, gift, income, and generation skipping transfer
tax effects.
Conversely, administrative provisions deal with the details of
trust operation. Typically, administrative provisions are added to
the trust instrument to expand the trustee's powers. Such powers
might include special powers for the management of real property,
additional authority to allocate receipts and expenses between
principal and income, express authority to retain assets, and so on.
State Street Trust Co. v. United States 7 is often cited as an
illustration of the unintended and unfavorable tax results that can
flow from trust administrative powers. In that case, the trustees
were given power to exchange trust property for other property
without reference to the value of the properties, the power to in-
vest assets in securities yielding either higher rates of income or no
tions Do Not Solve Ambiguities in Planning for Effective Use of Disclaimers, 10 EsT. PLAN.
8, 10 (1983).
67. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
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income at all, and the discretion to allocate assets to principal or
income. Additionally, the trust instrument provided that the trust-
ees were liable only for willful acts or defaults, but not for errors in
judgment, however gross. The settlor of the trust was one of the
trustees. The court noted that these powers, considered as a whole,
would allow the trustees to substantially shift the economic bene-
fits of the trusts between life tenants and remaindermen. Conse-
quently, the court held that the trust principal was includable in
the trustee's gross estate under the predecessor of section 2036."
Where the surviving spouse is to be the trustee of a
nonmarital trust, the chief tax concern lies with section 2041. If
she is the income beneficiary and has an administrative power to
invest in assets which will yield extraordinary income for the bene-
fit of herself at the expense of the remaindermen, does she not, in
effect, have a power to appoint property to herself? Additionally,
could it also be argued that she has power to vest corpus in herself
within the meaning of section 678(a)? If the surviving spouse is the
income beneficiary and has the power to invest in assets which will
yield little, if any, income for the ultimate benefit of an increasing
trust principal, could not such an investment constitute a taxable
gift?' 9
Fortunately, the Regulations offer the taxpayer some assur-
ances. Treasury Regulation section 20.2041-1(b) provides in part:
The mere power of management, investment, custody of assets, or
the power to allocate receipts and disbursements as between in-
come and principal, exercisable in a fiduciary capacity, whereby
the holder has no power to enlarge or shift any of the beneficial
interest therein except as an incidental consequence of the dis-
charge of such fiduciary duties is not a power of appointment.
Further, the right in a beneficiary of a trust to assent to a peri-
odic accounting, thereby relieving the trustee from further ac-
countability, is not a power of appointment if the right of assent
does not consist of any power or right to enlarge or shift the bene-
ficial interest of any beneficiary therein.70
Additionally, some case law tends to reduce the concern over ad-
ministrative powers so long as they are held in a fiduciary
capacity. 71
68. The First Circuit in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir.
1970) apparently overruled its decision in the principal First Circuit case. The court held
"that no aggregation of purely administrative powers can meet the government's amorphous
test of 'sufficient dominion and control' so as to be equated with ownership." Id. at 603.
69. See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(g), 25.2514-1.
70. Similar language for gift tax purposes is found in Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(b).
71. See Estate of Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919 (1971), aff'd 588 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.
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Prudence, however, requires the draftsman to examine local
law and review the proposed administrative provisions of
nonmarital trusts so that the fiduciary obligation of the trustee-
spouse is not lessened so as to produce an unfavorable tax effect.
The following are commonly used administrative provisions which
should be reviewed.
A. Principal and Income
Some trusts contain boilerplate provisions similar to the
following:
The trustee shall have the power, in her absolute discretion, to
determine how all receipts and disbursements shall be credited,
charged, or apportioned as between principal and income.
The effect of a provision which purports to give the trustee such
absolute discretion is unclear. 2 The clause may lift the restrictions
(or some of them) placed upon trustees by local law. If so, the trus-
tee might charge a disbursement against principal which would
otherwise be chargeable against income or credit a receipt to in-
come which would otherwise be credited to principal. If the effect
of such boilerplate should be to allow the trustee income benefi-
ciary to act in a non-fiduciary capacity, the trust principal would
be included in the trustee's estate under section 2041. Such clauses
simply should not be included in the trust instrument. 3
Additionally, it may even be unwise to rely on a jurisdiction's
Principal and Income Act. For example, the Uniform Principal and
Income Act (1931 version) does not authorize a depreciation re-
serve with respect to property held by the trustee.7' In jurisdic-
tions which have adopted the 1931 Act, such a reserve should be
required in the trust instrument.
Also, under both the 1931 Act and the 1962 Revised Act, the
detriment of all bond premiums and the benefit of all bond dis-
counts inures to principal. The 1962 Revised Act does, however,
provide an exception to this general rule:
The increment in value of a bond or other obligation for the pay-
1978); Robinson v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 347 (1980), aff'd 675 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
73. From a drafting standpoint, it may be well to expressly require the trustee to act
in accordance with a standard of good faith in allocating principal and income. See Form F
of the Appendix for an example of such a provision.
74. Section 13(a)(2) of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act (1962) does
require a reasonable allowance for depreciation on property subject to depreciation under
generally accepted accounting principles.
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ment of money payable at a future time in accordance with a
fixed schedule of appreciation in excess of the price at which it
was issued is distributable as income.75
This exception would not apply to Treasury Bills as they do not
have a "fixed schedule of appreciation." Furthermore, neither act
authorizes the amortization against income of a bond purchased at
a premium. Again, the solution would be to provide in the trust
instrument that the increment in value of Treasury Bills pur-
chased at a discount be distributable as income and to further re-
quire that bond premiums be amortized against income.
The trust instrument may need to accommodate other provi-
sions of local principal and income acts. Particular attention
should be given to depletion provisions and provisions relating to
unproductive and under productive property.
B. Power to Terminate the Trust
To avoid the administrative costs of administering a trust
which for one reason or another has decreased in value, some trust
instruments authorize the trustee to terminate the trust and dis-
tribute the trust principal to the income beneficiaries. If, as in the
prototype, the surviving spouse is both the income beneficiary and
the trustee of the nonmarital trust, the trust principal may be in-
cluded in her gross estate under section 2041. The Service has suc-
cessfully asserted that position before the courts.7"
Despite the existence of case law favorable to taxpayers on
this issue,7" prudence suggests that no such termination power be
included in the trust instrument. If such a power is deemed impor-
tant, it should be given to someone other than the spouse-income
beneficiary, or any other beneficiary for that matter. Another alter-
native would be to grant the power to the trustee solely if the mar-
ket value of the trust principal is less than a stated dollar amount.
Such a dollar amount might be expressly adjusted for inflation
with some well-known price index.
C. Miscellaneous Powers
A number of other powers commonly included in trust instru-
75. Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act § 7(b) (1962).
76. See Maytag v. United States, 493 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1974).
77. See Estate of McCoy v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd
511 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1975); Estate of McCord v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
13,042 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd 516 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995
(1975).
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ments should be considered. One is a power to limit the liability of
the trustee. The danger of such exoneration provisions when used
in conjunction with a dispositive power to distribute principal to
the spouse according to an ascertainable standard has already been
noted.78 The Service has also challenged exculpatory clauses when
used in conjunction with other broad administrative powers.79
Other powers which should be avoided include: (1) a power to
lend trust property to beneficiaries without adequate consideration
or adequate security; (2) a power to exchange trust property with
property owned by the trustee; and (3) a power which attempts to
eliminate the trustee's obligation of making accountings to the re-
maindermen. These powers could have an estate tax consequence.
V. LIFE INSURANCE ON THE LIFE OF THE SPOUSE-TRUSTEE
.Prior to the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981,80 a frequently used estate planning device was "cross owner-
ship" of life insurance policies. The wife would own policies on her
husband's life and the husband would own policies on his wife's
life. The primary purpose was to keep the insurance proceeds out
of the insured's gross estate because of the limitation on the
amount of the marital deduction. The new unlimited marital de-
duction has eliminated the estate tax advantages of cross owner-
ship. The insured's estate can now deduct the full amount of the
life insurance proceeds paid to his spouse as beneficiary without
incurring any federal estate tax liability on his death.
While the estate tax advantage has been eliminated, it is likely
that some spouses will continue cross ownership on existing poli-
cies even though they probably will not acquire additional policies
in cross ownership. In the absence of a specific devise to the con-
trary, such policies will likely become assets of the nonmarital
trust. If the surviving spouse is the trustee of that trust, the Ser-
vice will likely argue that the proceeds of the insurance should be
included in the insured-trustee's gross estate if she dies while act-
ing as trustee. The Service has prevailed in several cases before the
Fifth Circuit.81 The Service has also prevailed before the Court of
78. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
79. See Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1971).
80. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
81. Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
977 (1976); Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975). However, there is at least
one recent indication that the Service may be revising its stance on this issue. See Estate of
Bloch v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 850, 857 (1982).
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Claims.2 Contrary case law exists in other circuits.83
From a planning standpoint, consideration should first be
given to changing ownership of such policies. With the unlimited
marital deduction, the insured could be designated as the owner of
the policies and the spouse designated as a beneficiary. Such a
beneficiary designation should qualify for the marital deduction. If
the primary objective is to remove the insurance proceeds from the
gross estates of both husband and wife, consideration should be
given to transferring ownership of the policies directly to the chil-
dren, or a trust for their benefit.
If for some reason cross ownership is still desired, the wills of
both spouses could direct that all policies of life insurance on the
life of the other spouse be distributed to the children. If a trust is
thought advisable for the policies, a trustee other than the insured
spouse should be directed for those assets.
VI. SAVINGS CLAUSES AND OTHER DEFENSIVE DRAFTING
SUGGESTIONS
Because of the uncertainties associated with both dispositive
and administrative powers in a nonmarital trust where the surviv-
ing spouse is named trustee, prudence would suggest that the
draftsman include a savings clause indicating the testator's pri-
mary intent that none of the trust principal be included in her
estate.84
The effectiveness of any savings clause is, itself, uncertain.
Whether the clause will prevent the trust principal from being in-
cluded in the surviving spouse's gross estate probably depends
upon the defect sought to be cured. It is unlikely, for example, that
such a clause would undo a dispositive provision in the trust in-
strument which allows the surviving spouse to invade principal for
her happiness. Such would clearly constitute a general power of
appointment outside the ascertainable standard exception of sec-
tion 2041(b)(1)(A). However, such a clause would probably cure an
ambiguity between some administrative provision and the testa-
tor's intent not to have the trust principal included in the trustee-
spouse's gross estate. A number of courts have upheld the effec-
82. Genser v. United States, 600 F.2d 1349 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
83. Hunter v. United States, 624 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'g 474 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.
Mo. 1979); Connelly v. United States, 551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977) aff'g 398 F. Supp. 815
(D.N.J. 1975); Skifter v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g 56 T.C. 1190 (1971).
84. Such a clause could be modeled after that suggested by Johanson, The Use of Tax
Savings Clauses in Drafting Wills and Trusts, 15 INST. ON ESTATE PLAN. 1 2111 (1981). See
Form G of the Appendix for an example of such a clause.
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tiveness of savings clauses. 85 Not all such decisions, however, have
been favorable to the taxpayer.8 6 If properly drafted, the clause
should avoid the effect of such adverse decisions.
In addition to a savings clause, the trust instrument might also
expressly authorize the trustee to surrender powers. Such may be
advantageous in the income tax area. A power believed not to
cause trust income to be taxed to the trustee could in fact cause
such taxation, either through error on the part of the draftsman or
through subsequent changes in the law. 7 If the continued exis-
tence of a power is thought to be critical, the surrender power
might be coupled with authority to appoint a co-trustee, who
could, in turn, exercise the surrendered power. 88
VII. CONCLUSION
The appointment of the surviving spouse as trustee of the
nonmarital trust has disadvantages. The extent of these disadvan-
tages increases with the additional dispositive powers given to the
spouse-trustee. Clearly, for example, an intervivos power to dis-
tribute principal to the testator's children and their descendants
gives rise to generation skipping transfer tax exposure. The five or
five power gives rise to estate tax exposure in the year of the sur-
viving spouse's death as well as income tax exposure during the
surviving spouse's lifetime.
In addition to these disadvantages, the addition of dispositive
powers gives rise to uncertainties. For example, while some courts
have held that a power of withdrawal limited by an ascertainable
standard will not give rise to income taxation under section 678,
the matter is far from conclusively resolved. While the regulations
suggest that there will be no gift tax consequence if the income
beneficiary has authority to distribute principal to other benefi-
ciaries limited by an ascertainable standard, there is little case law
upon which to rely.
In addition to these disadvantages and uncertainties, it is im-
85. See Guiney v. United States, 425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970); Northeastern Pennsyl-
vania Nat'l Bank & Trust v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Pa. 1973); and Rev. Rul.
75-440, 1975-2 C.B. 372.
86. See Comm'r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944); Rev. Rul. 65-144, 1965-1 C.B.
442.
87. See Form H of the Appendix for an example of a clause which authorizes a trustee
to surrender powers. That form is modeled after one found in Bromberg & Fortson, Selec-
tion of a Trustee: Tax and Other Considerations, 19 Sw. L.J. 523, 560 (1965).
88. See Form I of the Appendix for an example of a clause which authorizes the ap-
pointment of a co-trustee and the surrender of powers to that trustee. That form is modeled
after one found in Bromberg & Fortson, id. at 563.
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portant to note that even if the trust includes all four of the pro-
posed additional dispositive powers discussed in this article, the
trust could be even more flexible if the spouse were not the trustee.
If she were not, the trustee could make discretionary distributions
of principal for her "general best interests" her "welfare," her
"happiness," or some other very broad guideline.
One of the most significant disadvantages of naming the
spouse as trustee is in the area of income distributions. Neither the
prototype, nor any of the additional dispositive provisions men-
tioned in this article, suggest that the spouse could accumulate in-
come or sprinkle income to a class of beneficiaries which might in-
clude the spouse and the testator's descendants. Section 678(a)(1)
would certainly cause the surviving spouse to be taxed on the trust
income because she would have a power exercisable solely by her-
self to vest the income in herself.
If, for example, a corporate trustee were appointed, the trust
could include such accumulation and sprinkling provisions. There
would be a significant practical advantage. Income could be dis-
tributed to those beneficiaries who have the greatest need. Addi-
tionally, accumulation and sprinkling provisions would add signifi-
cant opportunities for income tax planning. For example, the
trustee by distributing appreciated property could avoid capital
gains taxation on that appreciation. The beneficiary would receive
a stepped-up basis in the property.89 If, however, the trust instru-
ment requires the distribution of current income, the distribution
of appreciated property will be treated as satisfying a legal obliga-
tion of the trust, and the trust would have to recognize the gain.
The major tax advantages of accumulation trusts arise from
the taxation of such accumulated income to the trust as a separate
taxpayer. Income could be accumulated in the trust when the ben-
eficiary is in a higher income tax bracket. The accumulated income
could be distributed subsequently to the beneficiary when the ben-
eficiary's tax bracket is lower. Of course, the throw back rules of
sections 665 and 667 would apply. Under these throwback rules,
the beneficiary is taxed on the accumulated income in a manner
similar to that as if the beneficiary had received the trust income
in the year it was earned by the trust. Consequently, with the
throwback rules, it is possible that we will not achieve an overall
tax savings. But equally clearly, we may achieve tax deferral with-
out interest. Furthermore, it is possible to achieve an overall tax
89. See Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f); Rev. Rul. 72-295, 1972-1 C.B. 197; Rev. Rul. 67-74,
1967-1, C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 64-314, 1964-2 C.B. 167.
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savings when distributions are planned with the throwback rules in
mind. For example, if the trust beneficiary has substantial taxable
income while the trust is accumulating its income and if distribu-
tions to that beneficiary can be delayed five years until after the
beneficiary's taxable income has been reduced (perhaps five years
after the beneficiary retires), the throwback rules can result in an
overall tax savings as well as tax deferral. Or, distributions of accu-
mulated income could be made to a beneficiary (a child or
grandchild of the testator) who was under the age of twenty-one
when the trust accumulated the income.
Additional tax savings can be achieved in such a trust where
the permissible income beneficiaries include the testator's children
and other descendants. The trustee could distribute income to
those beneficiaries in the lowest tax brackets to achieve the great-
est overall tax savings. As noted, however, no distribution should
be made which would satisfy a legal obligation of support.90
In short, a number of non-tax and tax benefits have been lost
when the surviving spouse is named the trustee of the nonmarital
trust. To estate owners with large estates-probably in excess of
$1,500,000 or $2,000,000-this is reason enough not to name the
surviving spouse as trustee. To estate owners with smaller estates,
the loss of income tax planning opportunities can perhaps be com-
pensated for with the use of other income tax planning devices she
can use with her own property. She may make gifts of income pro-
ducing assets to her children, establish Clifford trusts, and make
investments in municipal bonds and other tax shelters. For the cli-
ent whose sole motive in establishing a nonmarital trust is the
minimization of the federal estate tax, the appointment of the sur-
viving spouse as trustee of a properly drafted trust is an estate
planning option worthy of consideration.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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APPENDIX
FORM A
At any time and from time to time during the continuance of
the trust, the trustee shall pay to or expend for the benefit of my
wife, so much or all, if any, of the principal the trustee determines
to be necessary considering other resources known to the trustee to
be available to my wife, to provide for her health, education, and
support in the manner of living to which she has been accustomed.
FORM B
Subject to the limitation of the sentence immediately follow-
ing, at any time and from time to time during the continuance of
the trust, the trustee shall pay to or expend for the benefit of my
children and their descendants, so much or all, if any, of the prin-
cipal the trustee determines to be necessary, considering other re-
sources known to the trustee to be available to my children and
their descendants, to provide for their health, education, and sup-
port. However, no distribution shall be paid, distributed or applied
for the support which the trustee is legally obligated to provide a
beneficiary, nor to defray any legal obligation of the trustee.
FORM C
The trustee shall also distribute to my wife such portion of the
principal of the trust, not exceeding in any calendar year the
greater of $5,000 or five percent of the value of the principal of the
trust at the end of the calender year, as she from time to time
requests in writing. The power of my wife to withdraw principal
shall be noncumulative. Any amount not withdrawn in any calen-
dar year shall lapse and may not be withdrawn in any later year.
FORM D
Upon the death of my wife after my death, the trustee shall
distribute the trust principal to, or in trust for the benefit of, such
person or persons among my descendants, upon such conditions
and estates, with such powers, in such manner and at such time or
times as my wife appoints and directs by will specifically referring
to this power of appointment.
To the extent my wife does not effectively exercise her power
of appointment, upon her death (or upon my death if my wife does
not survive me), the trustee shall divide the trust principal in
equal separate shares, one for each then living child of mine and
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one for the then living descendants, collectively, for each deceased
child of mine. The trustee shall distribute each share for a living
child of mine to such child. The trustee shall distribute each share
set aside for the descendants of a deceased child of mine to such
descendants, by representation.
FORM E
If my wife survives me, I devise all of my residuary estate,
other than any property which my wife has effectively disclaimed,
to my wife. I devise all of my property which my wife has effec-
tively disclaimed, in trust to the trustee hereinafter named under
the following terms and conditions:
FORM F
The discretion of the trustee in administering the trust, in-
cluding the discretion of the trustee in determining allocations be-
tween principal and income, is not absolute. Rather such discretion
is subject to the standard of reasonableness and good faith to all
beneficiaries. The trustee shall act fairly and impartially between
the income and the remainder beneficiaries.
FORM G
It is my primary intent that the property comprising the trust
estate of this trust shall not be included in my spouse's gross estate
for federal estate taxation purposes, notwithstanding any provision
in my will that might be construed as comprising this objective. All
questions regarding this trust shall be resolved accordingly. The
powers and discretions of the personal representative and the trus-
tee with respect to administration of my estate and of the trust
estate shall not be exercised or exercisable except in a manner con-
sistent with my intent as expressed in this paragraph. To the ex-
tent that any other provision of my will conflicts with my primary
intent as expressed in this paragraph, giving rise to an ambiguity,
the ambiguity shall be resolved as directed in this paragraph.
FORM H
The trustee shall have power and authority to surrender, re-
lease, renounce, or disclaim any one or more of the powers given to
the trustee. Any such surrender, release, renunciation, or dis-
claimer shall be made by written instrument and shall be acknowl-
edged. After any power has been so surrendered, released, re-
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nounced, or disclaimed, it shall never again be exercised by that
trustee.
FORM I
The trustee may at any time designate another individual or a
corporation to act as co-trustee. Such designation shall be by writ-
ten instrument, acknowledged, and delivered to the designated co-
trustee. Any designation shall be revocable until the co-trustee has
accepted appointment and entered upon its duties as co-trustee;
such revocation shall be in the same form as the original designa-
tion. Such designation may delegate, in whole or in part, any or all
of the powers and discretions given to the trustee.
